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I. INTRODUCTION
In the principal article for this Symposium, Professor Erwin
Chemerinsky develops the thesis that the Roberts Court, or, as he puts it,
in actuality the Anthony Kennedy Court, "is the most conservative Court
since the mid-1930s and is a court that generally favors the government
over claims of individual rights and business interests over those of
employees and consumers."' He maintains that, "[o]n issues that are
defined by ideology, the conservative position prevails in the Roberts
Court except when Justice Kennedy joins with Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, ' 2 and that, "[w]hen the Court is divided 5-4 on
issues where there are clear liberal and conservative positions, Justice
Kennedy is the swing vote."3 As to the Court's conservatism,
Chemerinsky states as follows:
What does it mean to say that the Court is more conservative
than its predecessor courts, the Rehnquist, Burger and Warren
Courts? It is notably more conservative on the issues that in our
society today are often the litmus tests for ideology: abortion and
t Distinguished Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. B.A., 1956,
University of Pittsburgh; J.D., 1959, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.
1. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court at Age 3, 54 WAYNE L. REv. 947, 948
(2008).
2. Id. at 953.
3. Id.
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race. I also believe that it will be much more conservative on
issues of separation of church and state, but they have not yet
been presented to the Roberts Court. Also, it is a Court that,
overall, is very pro-business. The one area where the Roberts
Court has not been conservative is in its rulings against the Bush
Administration's actions as to the Guantanamo detainees. But
this is because Justice Kennedy has joined Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer in these cases.
Professor Chemerinsky goes on to say that he does not want to
overstate the conservatism of the Roberts Court, that there have been
rulings where the Court did not come down on the conservative side of
the issue, and that, "the most important disappointments for
conservatives have been in the two cases ruling against the Bush
administration with regard to the Guantanamo detainees, [where] Justice
Kennedy joined with Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer to
create the majority." 5
There is no doubt that in terms of the ideological views of the
Justices on the Court, the Roberts Court is more conservative than the
Rehnquist Court, since conservative Chief Justice Roberts replaced
moderate Justice O'Connor, and conservative Chief Justice Rehnquist
was replaced by conservative Justice Alito. As Professor Chemerinsky
has demonstrated, in ten high profile 5-4 decisions of the Court during
the Roberts years, Justice Kennedy decided with the conservatives in
seven of them and with the liberals in only three.7 This change in the
ideological line-up of the Court, and the pattern of results in these cases
support Professor Chemerinsky's thesis as to the conservative direction
of the Roberts Court.
It should be noted that Professor Chemerinsky and other
commentators use the terms "liberal," "conservative," and "moderate" in
the popular sense rather than in any philosophical or theoretical sense.
"Conservative" Justices are opposed to the use of racial preferences 8 and
support the right of individual gun ownership under the Second
Amendment. 9 "Liberal" Justices support limited racial preferences for
4. Id. at 956.
5. Id. at 972. The cases are Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), and
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). Both cases will be discussed more fully
subsequently.
6. See discussion, infra.
7. See Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 953-55.
8. See Parents Involved in Community Schools. v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 127 S.
Ct. 2738 (2007).
9. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
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racial minorities' 0 and oppose an "individual rights" interpretation of the
Second Amendment."' In those two areas then, it is the "conservative"
Justices who favor the individual and the "liberal" Justices who favor the
government. When it comes to abortion and other individual rights
asserted under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, the
"liberal" Justices favor the recognition of individual rights and the
"conservative" Justices oppose it. 12 In regard to the rights of persons
accused of crime, the "liberal" Justices favor the defendant while the
"conservative" Justices favor the government. 13 In the area of the First
Amendment, where the Court as an institution has extended very strong
protection to First Amendment rights,"4 there is less of a "liberal"-
"conservative" split. To the extent that such a split can be identified,
"conservative" Justices are more disposed to hold campaign finance laws
unconstitutional, while "liberal" Justices are more disposed to uphold
them.' 5 Here again, the "conservative" Justices are supporting the
individual while the "liberal" Justices are supporting the government. 16
Otherwise, whenever the Court divides on a First Amendment question,
the "liberals" are more disposed to uphold the First Amendment claim
while the "conservatives" are more disposed to reject it. 17 In cases
brought under federal civil rights laws or anti-discrimination laws, the
10. See Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738.
11. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783.
12. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
13. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008).
14. See Robert A. Sedler, An Essay on Freedom of Speech: The United States Versus
the Rest of the World, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REv. 377 (2006).
15. In the 2007 Term cases of Wisconsin Right to Life v. Federal Election
Commission, 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007), and Davis v. Federal Election Commission, 128 S.
Ct. 2759 (2008), Justice Kennedy joined the four conservatives in both cases to strike
down aspects of federal campaign finance law. The four liberal justices dissented in both
cases. In McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), the four liberal
Justices on the current Court, joined by former Justice O'Connor, voted to uphold most of
the provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), while Justices
Scalia, Thomas and Kennedy of the current Court, joined by former Chief Justices
Rehnquist, dissented. Id. at 110.
16. See Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. 2652; Davis, 128 S. Ct. 2759.
17. As in Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007), where Justice Kennedy joined
the four conservatives to hold that the First Amendment was not violated when a high
school student was disciplined for displaying a banner that the principal interpreted as
advocating illegal drug use, and in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006), where
Justice Kennedy joined the conservative Justices to hold that the First Amendment did
not protect the speech of government employees when made in the scope of their
employment. The four liberal Justices dissented in both cases.
10352008]
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"liberals" are expected to favor the claimant while the "conservatives"
are expected to favor the government. '
8
In this article, I will be looking at the Roberts Court in a somewhat
different way from that of Professor Chemerinsky and will be providing
a somewhat different perspective on the Court. I will be looking to the
operation of the Court as an institution, to departures by the individual
Justices from traditional "liberal" and "conservative" positions, and to
what I consider to be the essentially settled nature of American
constitutional law at the present time.' 9 I will discuss the high profile
cases Professor Chemerinsky identifies in which the Court lined up
across traditional liberal-conservative lines. I will also discuss other
cases, in some of which the Court lined up along traditional liberal-
conservative lines, and in some of which it did not. My conclusion about
the Roberts Court may differ to some extent from that of Professor
Chemerinsky, and my conclusion would likely be disputed by many
constitutional commentators and court watchers. My conclusion is as
follows:
The Roberts Court has moved in a conservative direction, but not by
very much. The decisions of the Roberts Court will have some impact on
American constitutional law, but not very much.
II. THE OPERATION OF THE COURT AS AN INSTITUTION
In analyzing the direction of the Court, constitutional commentators
tend to focus, as Professor Chemerinsky has done, on the Court's high
profile decisions, usually involving a 5-4 split among the Justices. 20 But
those decisions comprise a relatively small part of the Court's work.2'
The Court operates as an institution. It decides the cases coming before it
with reference to the facts of those cases and the applicable constitutional
or statutory doctrine. Once a case is fully briefed and argued, the Justices
may all arrive at the same conclusion as to the proper decision in the
case. As with any decisional body, the Members of the Court try to reach
18. See Ledbetter v. Goodyear, 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
19. See Robert A. Sedler, The Settled Nature of American Constitutional Law, 48
WAYNE L. REv. 173 (2002) [Hereinafter Sedler, Settled Nature].
20. Chemerinsky, supra note 1 at 953-55.
21. See The Statistics, 122 HARV. L. REv. 516 (2008) [Hereinafter, The Statistics
(2007 Term)]; The Statistics, 121 HARv. L. REv. 436 (2007) [hereinafter, The Statistics
(2006 Term)]; The Statistics, 120 HARV L. REv. 372 (2006) [hereinafter, The Statistics
(2005 Term)] (providing statistical analysis of the 2007 Term, 2006 Term, and 2005
Term, respectively).
1036 [Vol. 54:1033
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a consensus, which often results in compromise and a fairly narrow
holding. 2
2
Of course, the ideological views of the individual Members of the
Court affect the workings of the Court as an institution. And, as
Professor Chemerinsky has demonstrated, those ideological differences
will most likely appear in high profile constitutional and civil rights
cases in which the Court is sharply divided. 3 But constitutional cases
comprise only a minority of the cases that the Court hears each Term. In
the 2007 Term, sixteen of the seventy cases involved constitutional
claims. 24 In the 2006 Term, it was twenty-one out of seventy-one. 25 In
the 2005 Term, it was fourteen out of sixty-nine. 26 The larger number of
cases involve a myriad of federal questions within the Court's
jurisdiction, such as those pertaining to the application of federal statutes
and the operation of the federal courts.27 Ideological differences are less
likely to appear in these cases, but sometimes the Justices disagree as to
the proper result in these cases as well. In any event, looking to both the
constitutional and non-constitutional cases, the operation of the Court as
an institution means that despite the ideological and other differences
among the Justices, by far the largest number of the Court's decisions
every Term are unanimous or near-unanimous.28
This is the result that has obtained in the three Terms of the Roberts
Court.29 In the 2007 Term, there were seventy written decisions,
including three per curiams.30 Twenty-two decisions, or 30.55%, were
unanimous, 3 1 and twenty-four more were decided by votes of 8-1 or 7-2.
So, forty-six out of the seventy decisions, or 63.88%, were unanimous or
near-unanimous.32 In fifteen decisions, or 21.42%, there were three
22. According to the oft-quoted concurring opinion of Justice Brandeis in Ashwander
v. Tennessee Valley Authority, it is a rule of constitutional decision-making that "[tihe
Court will not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the
precise facts to which it is to be applied." 297 U.S. 288, 346-47 (1936) (citation omitted).
As will be pointed out subsequently, a number of the high profile decisions of the Roberts
Court reflect this rule of constitutional decision-making.
23. Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 953-54.
24. The Statistics (2007 Term), supra note 21, at 547.
25. The Statistics (2006 Term), supra note 21, at 447.
26. The Statistics (2005 Term), supra note 21, at 382.
27. See The Statistics (2007 Term), supra note 21; The Statistics (2006 Term), supra
note 21; The Statistics (2005 Term), supra note 21.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. The Statistics (2007 Term), supra note 21.
31. Id. at 521.
32. Supreme Court Decisions for the 2004 Term, the 2005 Term, the 2006 Term, and
2007 Term (on file with author) [hereinafter "Author's Statistics"].
1037
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
dissents. The number of 5-4 decisions in the 2007 Term was twelve out
of seventy, or 15.27%. 33
In the 2006 Term, the Court was somewhat more divided, but still
showed a high level of agreement. 34 There were seventy-one decisions,
including four per curiams. 35 Twenty-eight decisions, or 39.4%, were
unanimous. 36 Forty-nine decisions, or 69%, were 6-3 or higher.37 But the
number of 5-4 decisions that Term was twenty-two or 3 1%.38
In the 2005 Term, there were eighty-one decisions.39 Thirty-six
decisions, or 49%, were unanimous. 40 Another twenty-one decisions
were 6-3 or higher.4' Thus, fifty-five decisions, or 79.7%, were 6-3 or
higher, while sixteen decisions, or 21.3%, were 5-4 or 5-3.42 In the 2004
Term, the last Term before the composition of the Court had changed,
sixteen of the seventy-four decisions, or 22%, were 5-4.43 On average,
then, we see that typically in one out of five decisions, or 20%, the Court
divides 5-4, and not all of the 5-4 decisions are high profile constitutional
ones.
The cases in which the Roberts Court has rendered a unanimous or
near-unanimous decision include cases raising questions that might be
expected to produce an ideological split. In the 2007 Term, the Roberts
Court rendered the following decisions that were unanimous or had no
more than two dissents. The Court unanimously upheld, against a First
Amendment claim, New York's system of choosing party nominees for
the lower courts by primary elections to the party's nominating
conventions. 44 The Court unanimously held that police officers did not
violate the Fourth Amendment by arresting a person whom they had
probable cause to believe had violated Virginia law by driving with a
suspended license, even though as a matter of Virginia law, this
misdemeanor offense was one for which the officers should have issued
a summons rather than made an arrest. 45 The Court unanimously held
that the federal courts had jurisdiction over a habeas corpus petition filed
33. The Statistics (2007 Term), supra note 21, at 522.
34. The Statistics (2006 Term), supra note 21.
35. Id. at 436.
36. Id. at 441.
37. Author's Statistics, supra note 32.
38. Id.
39. The Statistics (2005 Term), supra note 21, at 372.
40. Id. at 377.
41. Author's Statistics, supra note 32.
42. Id.
43. The Statistics (2005 Term), supra note 21.
44. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 128 S. Ct. 791 (2008).
45. Virginia v. Moore, 128 S. Ct. 1598, 1607 (2008).
1038 [Vol. 54:1033
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on behalf of American citizens held in Iraq in a detainee camp operated
by the Multinational Forces-Iraq, but that the federal courts could not
exercise jurisdiction to enjoin the United States from transferring
individuals alleged to have committed crimes and detained within Iraq to
the Iraq government for criminal prosecution.4 6 It held 7-1 that the
exemption from liability for a disparate impact claim under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act4 7 for employer actions based on
reasonable factors other than age created an affirmative defense on which
the employer bears both the burden of production and the burden of
persuasion a.4 It held 8-1 that a criminal defendant's initial appearance
before a magistrate judge, where the defendant learns the charge against
him and where his liberty is subject to restriction marks the initiation of
adversary proceedings that trigger attachment of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel. 49 It held 7-2 that in a Batson challenge, 50 the
prosecutor's proffered reason for striking an African-American
prospective juror was a pretext for racial discrimination.5' It held 7-2 that
Kentucky's three-drug lethal injection method of capital punishment did
not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment.52 In a 7-2 decision, the Court upheld the State of
Washington's blanket primary system under which the candidates for
office are identified on the ballot by their designated "party preference,"
the voters may vote for any candidate, and the two top vote-getters for
each office, regardless of "party preference," advance to the general
election. 53 Finally, in two 7-2 decisions, the Court upheld the power of
Federal District Judges to justify sentences outside the Sentencing
Guidelines, including the power to conclude that the Guidelines' 100-1
ratio for crack/powder cocaine was "greater than necessary" in the
particular case to achieve the objectives of the Sentencing Guidelines.
54
In the 2006 Term, the Court rendered the following decisions that
were unanimous or had no more than two dissents. The Court
46. Munafv. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207, 2213 (2008).
47. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2009).
48. Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 128 S. Ct. 2395, 2401-02 (2008). Justice
Breyer took no part in consideration of nor the decision. Id. at 2397.
49. Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 128 S. Ct. 2578, 2581 (2008).
50. Snyder v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 1203, 1206 (2008). A Batson challenge is when a
criminal defendant alleges that the prosecutor exercises some of his or her peremptory
jury challenges on the basis of race. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
51. Snyder, 128 S. Ct. at 1206.
52. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1526 (2008).
53. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1187
(2008).
54. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007); Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S.
Ct. 558 (2007).
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unanimously held per curiam that police officers enjoyed qualified
immunity for a search where the warrant for the premises listed the
suspects as African-American, the occupants were Caucasian, and they
were made to get out of bed and stand naked for a few minutes while the
officers verified that the blanket and the bedding did not have concealed
weapons. 55 It held 8-1 that a police officer enjoyed qualified immunity
when the officer tried to stop a fleeing motorist from continuing his
public-endangering flight by ramming the motorist's vehicle from
behind.56 On the other side of the ledger, the Court held unanimously
that where a police officer makes a traffic stop, a passenger in the vehicle
is seized in the same manner as the driver and, thus, may challenge the
constitutionality of the stop.57 The Court unanimously rejected two First
Amendment claims, holding that it does not violate the First Amendment
for a state to require that public sector labor unions receive affirmative
authorization from a non-member before spending the non-members
agency shop fees to election-related purposes,58 or for a state
interscholastic athletic association to enforce an anti-recruiting rule, here
applied to prohibit a high school coach from sending a letter to middle
school students inviting them to attend spring practice sessions.5 9
In the 2005 Term, when Roberts and Alito joined the Court, the
Court rendered unanimous decisions in the following cases. It held that
while there must be an emergency exception to a parental notification
provision for a minor's abortion, the lack of such an exception does not
make the law unconstitutional, and an injunction can be issued only
against the unconstitutional provision in the law.60 It upheld against First
Amendment challenge the Solomon Amendment requiring universities
receiving federal funds to give military recruiters the same access as
other employers. 6' It ruled that under the federal Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 62 the federal narcotics law would not be applied to
prevent a small religious sect from importing a hallucinogenic tea central
to its religious worship. 63 It held that a state could not constitutionally
apply an evidentiary rule that prevented a defendant from putting on a
55. Los Angeles County v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609 (2007).
56. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
57. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007).
58. Davenport v. Wash. Ed. Ass'n, 127 S. Ct. 2372 (2007).
59. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n v. Brentwood Acad., 550 U.S. 291 (2007).
60. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, 546 U.S. 320 (2006).
61. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006)
(Alito, J., abstaining).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l-4 (2009).
63. Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418
(2006) (Alito, J., abstaining).
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complete defense, here a restriction on introducing evidence of third-
party guilt.64 In applying the Sixth Amendment's right of confrontation,
it held that a crime victim's emergency 911 call could be introduced even
if the victim was not present for a confrontation, but not a crime victim's
statement to police who were investigating the crime. 65 Finally, it held
that a Title VII retaliation claim did not require proof of adverse
employment consequences due to the filing of the claim.
66
As the above discussion demonstrates, the Court operates as an
institution. All of the Justices operate within the Court's institutional
framework and all are on the same page to the extent that they all are
applying or purport to be applying the same constitutional doctrine to the
facts of the case before them. They try to achieve consensus, and in order
to achieve that consensus, they may agree to a fairly narrow holding. The
operation of the Court as an institution serves to limit the extent to which
a change in the Court's composition will bring about a major change in
the body of constitutional law.
III. DEPARTURES BY THE INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES FROM TRADITIONAL
"LIBERAL" AND "CONSERVATIVE" POSITIONS
The ideological differences among the Members of the Court are
tempered by the fact that the individual Justices have different views
about the meaning of different constitutional provisions, and these views
do not necessarily break down on conventional "liberal"-"conservative"
lines. For example, Justice Scalia, who as a "conservative" Justice
generally takes a narrow view of the constitutional rights of persons
accused of crime, has a different view with respect to the rights
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. He strongly supports the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial,67 the right to confrontation,68 and the
right to be represented by counsel of one's choice. 69 Similarly, while he
64. Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006).
65. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). Justice Thomas dissented on the
second point. Id.
66. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
67. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498 (2000) (Scalia, J.
concurring) (discussing the historical basis of the right to trial by jury and its application
to prohibit a judge from finding the facts resulting in an increased sentence).
68. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). The Court held that playing a
tape-recorded statement at a criminal defendant's trial, in which the defendant's wife,
who because of the state marital privilege did not testify at trial, had described the
defendant's stabbing of the victim to the police, violated the Sixth Amendment's
confrontation clause. Id.
69. In United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, Justice Scalia joined with the four liberal
Justices to hold that the wrongful denial of the Sixth Amendment right to be represented
1041
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has come down on the side of the Bush Administration with respect to
detaining enemy aliens at Guantanamo and to otherwise limiting the
rights of enemy aliens, 70 and he strongly maintains that the Constitution
prohibits detaining an American citizen and that the government must
either charge the citizen with a crime or release the citizen from
custody. 71 Likewise when it comes to constitutional limitations on the
award of punitive damages, the "liberal"-"conservative" division breaks
down completely, with Justices Stevens, Breyer, Souter, and Kennedy of
the present Court, maintaining that the due process clause imposes
limitations on the power of states to award punitive damages, while
Justices Scalia, Ginsburg and Thomas maintain that it does not.72
Moreover, ideological differences do not always come to the fore
when the Justices are applying constitutional or statutory doctrine to the
facts of a particular case. All of the Justices are applying or purport to be
applying the same constitutional doctrine to the facts of the case before
them, and, totally apart from ideology, the Justices may disagree with the
result that should follow from the application of that doctrine to the facts
of particular cases. This disagreement appears in cases where there is
both a majority opinion and a dissent, and one or more "liberals" joins
the "conservative" majority, or where one of more "conservatives" joins
the "liberal" majority.
To illustrate, in the 2007 Term, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices
Stevens, Souter, and Thomas joined Justice Breyer to hold, over the
dissents of Justices Kennedy, Scalia, Ginsburg and Alito, that
Kentucky's retirement plan for hazardous occupation employees, under
which employees who became disabled before standard retirement age
by counsel of one's choice was a structural error, requiring automatic reversal of a
conviction. 548 U.S. 140 (2006).
70. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466,488 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting), Hamdan, 548
U.S. at 655; Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2293 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
71. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 614 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
72. See the line-up of the Court in BMWofNorth America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559
(1996) and State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). In
Philip Morris USA v. Williams, the Court held 5-4, with Justice Stevens dissenting, and
Justices Ginsburg, Scalia and Thomas writing a separate dissent, that a jury's punitive
damages award designed to punish the defendant for harming persons who are not before
the court would amount to a "taking of property" from the defendant. 549 U.S. 346
(2007). In Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, with Justice Alito not participating, the Court
affirmed by an equally divided court, the lower court's ruling that a defendant could be
liable in punitive damages for the reckless acts of its managerial employees. 128 S. Ct.
2605 (2008). The Court based its decision on maritime law and held that in this case, a
1:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages was appropriate. Id. at 2634. Concurring
and dissenting opinions referred to the positions that the Justices took in the
constitutionally-based decisions. Id. at 2634-41.
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could receive credit for "imputed" years not actually worked, while
employees who worked past standard age and then became disabled
could not receive such a credit, did not violate the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act.73 Likewise, Justice Stevens, joined by the four
conservatives, with Justices Breyer, Kennedy, Souter and Ginsburg
dissenting, wrote the opinion for the Court in a case holding that a rule of
criminal procedure requiring notice that the court is contemplating a
departure from the recommended guideline sentencing range on a ground
not identified for departure either in the presentence report or in a party's
prehearing submission, was not applicable to a variance from the
recommended range.74
In the 2006 Term, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Chief Justice Roberts
and Justices Stevens, Scalia, Souter, and Thomas, with Justices Alito,
Kennedy, and Breyer dissenting, wrote the opinion for the Court in a
case holding that California's determinate sentencing law, which
authorized the judge rather than the jury to find the facts exposing the
defendant to an elevated upper term sentence, violated the defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.75 In that Term, there was also a
5-4 decision to the effect that attempt offenses may qualify as predicates
for sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act 76 when they
involve conduct that presents a serious potential risk of injury, here
interpreted as including attempted burglary, as defined by Florida law,
which is a violent felony under the Act.77 The Court majority consisted
of Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Alito, Kennedy, Souter and
Breyer,78  with Justices Scalia, Stevens, Ginsburg and Thomas
dissenting. 
79
In the 2005 Term, Chief Justice Roberts joined with the four liberal
Justices 80 to hold that the state's failure to follow-up on a mailed notice
to a property owner that was returned "undelivered" violated procedural
due process. 8' In a similar vein, that Term the Court held 5-4 that a
73. Ky. Retirement Systems v. E.E.O.C., 128 S. Ct. 2361 (2008). In that connection,
the Court also held that in order to state a disparate impact claim under the Act where the
employer adopts a pension plan that includes age as a factor and then treats employees
differently based on pension status, an employee subject to the plan must present
sufficient evidence to show that the differential treatment was actually motivated by age
and not by pension status. Id. at 2370.
74. Irizarry v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 2198 (2008).
75. Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007).
76. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2009).
77. James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 222 (2006).
81. Id. at 225.
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federal court, on its own initiative, could dismiss a habeas corpus petition
as untimely. 82 Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Ginsburg. Kennedy,
Souter and Alito were in the majority, and Justices Stevens, Breyer,
Scalia, and Thomas dissented.83
As the above discussion demonstrates, the fact that ideological
differences do not always come to the fore when the Justices are
applying constitutional or statutory doctrine to the facts of a particular
case also serves to limit the extent to which a change in the Court's
composition will bring about a major change in the body of
constitutional law.
IV. THE HIGH PROFILE DECISIONS OF THE ROBERTS COURT AND THE
SETTLED NATURE OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
In emphasizing that the Roberts Court has moved in a conservative
direction and that Justice Kennedy is the deciding vote on issues that are
defined by ideology, Professor Chemerinsky states that, "Each of the
most important and high profile cases during the Roberts era has been
decided by a 5-4 margin, and in each Anthony Kennedy was in the
majority., 84 He lists ten cases falling in this category, and says that there
would be "widespread agreement that they were the most important
decisions of the Roberts Court., 85 It is my submission that important as
these cases may be in demonstrating the movement of the Roberts Court
in a conservative direction, they will have relatively little impact on
American constitutional law.
This is because, as I have tried to demonstrate more fully elsewhere,
at this point in time in the nation's history, American constitutional law
has evolved to a stage where it may be considered essentially settled.86
The statement that American constitutional law is essentially settled
may seem heretical at a time when there is continuing academic debate
over proper standards of constitutional interpretation, 87 when academic
commentators are proposing a plethora of theories about the meaning of
many constitutional provisions, and when many constitutional cases
coming before the Supreme Court are characterized by the media as
potential "landmark" decisions. However, in the real world of
82. Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 209 (2006) rehearing denied, 549 U.S. 1261
(2001).
83. Id. at 200.
84. Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 953.
85. Id. at 953-54.
86. Sedler, Settled Nature, supra note 19, at 175-76.
87. See id. (discussing academic and media commentary).
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constitutional litigation in which constitutional cases that actually arise
are litigated and decided by the Supreme Court, the lower federal courts,
and the state courts, the "law of the Constitution" that provides the
analytical basis for the resolution of these cases is essentially settled.88
By the "law of the Constitution," I mean the doctrine and precedent
that has emerged from the decisions of the Supreme Court in the
different areas of constitutional law over a long period of time.
89
Most of the constitutional cases coming before the Supreme Court
for decision today, important as some of them may be in terms of public
policy and societal impact-including "the most important and high
profile cases during the Roberts era" 90 that have been identified by
Professor Chemerinsky-fall into this category. They involve the
application of this doctrine and precedent to particular constitutional
questions-some very narrow-arising from new laws and new kinds of
governmental action. In these kinds of cases, the Court will sometimes
expand or contract existing doctrine and precedent and will occasionally
overrule a particular precedent. However, the essential nature of the "law
of the Constitution" that has evolved from nearly two centuries of
constitutional interpretation remains intact, and such change as there is
will occur mostly around the edges. To put it another way, the structure
of the "law of the Constitution" has now been established, and
constitutional cases are litigated, analyzed, and decided within the
framework provided by that structure. The structure does not change, and
the doctrine and precedents that comprise that structure are the starting
point for the analysis and determination of every question that arises in
the real world of constitutional litigation.
91
As the Court has decided more and more cases, and has resolved
more and more constitutional issues, the Court has narrowed
considerably the potential scope of constitutional interpretation. 
92
A review of the "most important and high profile cases during the
Roberts era" 93 demonstrates that the Court has decided these cases with
reference to the settled nature of American constitutional law. With the
exception of its decision in Heller,94 where the Court held that the
Second Amendment created a private individual right to possess
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 953.
91. Sedler, Settled Nature, supra note 19, at 176-77.
92. Id. at 177. While the Court has the power to overrule its prior decisions, a
longitudinal analysis indicates that comparatively few decisions have been overruled. See
id. at 177-78 (discussing and reviewing overrulings).
93. Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 953.
94. 128 S. Ct. 2783.
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handguns in the home (although making it clear that this newly
recognized right was subject to significant governmental regulation), 95
the Court applied settled constitutional doctrine and precedent, although
sometimes seemingly contracting a precedent, as it applied that precedent
to the facts of a particular case, 96 and other times seemingly expanding a
precedent, as it applied it to the facts of a particular case. 97
The Court's "politically controversial" decision in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld,98 holding that the military commissions established by the
Bush Administration were not authorized by Congress, can be traced
back to a Korean War holding that President Truman did not have the
power to order the seizure of the steel mills to prevent a labor strike that
would curtail steel production, in disregard of federal labor law dealing
with this situation.99 In every case coming before the Court involving the
Bush Administration's assertion that the President has the inherent power
under Article II to take any action he considers necessary in the "war on
terrorism," the Court has rejected this assertion of presidential power,
insofar as it is inconsistent with the exercise of congressional power. 100
95. Id. at 2821-22.
96. See Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (holding unconstitutional individual
race-based assignments in the public schools designed to further diversity, while
contracting the precedent of Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), where it held that
public universities, in order to further diversity, could consider race as one factor in
student assignments). See also Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (upholding, on its face, the
constitutionality of the federal Partial Birth Abortion Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp. IV
2000) (hereinafter "the Act"), even though the Act did not contain a "health of the
mother" exception, which appeared to contract the precedent of Stenberg v. Carhart, 550
U.S. 914, 937 (2000), where one of the grounds for invalidating Nebraska's partial
abortion ban was that it did not include a "health of the mother" exception).
97. In striking down aspects of federal campaign finance law in Fed. Election
Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, and Davis v. Fed. Election Comm'n, the Court was
applying constitutional doctrine relating to First Amendment limitations on governmental
regulation of campaign financing, beginning with Buckley v. Valeo. See Wis. Right to
Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2671; Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2770-71; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976). The Court has rendered a series of fact-specific decisions in this area, such as in
Fed. Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, holding that the ban on direct contributions by
corporations can constitutionally be applied to ban such contributions by nonprofit
advocacy corporations, and McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm "n, where the Court upheld
most of the "soft money" restrictions contained in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
of 2002, U.S.C. § 441i (2002). See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146,
159-60 (2003), McConnell, 540 U.S. at 144-56. The Court's decisions in Wisconsin Right
to Life and Davis may be seen as an expansion of the Buckley line of cases invalidating
campaign finance restrictions.
98. 548 U.S. at 611-12.
99. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585-87 (1952).
100. In Hamdan, the Court noted in a footnote that: "Whether or not the President has
independent power, absent Congressional authorization, to convene military
commissions, he may not disregard limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its
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Finally, in Boumediene v. Bush, 10 the Court's decision was based on an
interpretation of the "suspension" clause of Article I, sec. 9, which
allows Congress to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in times of
rebellion or invasion. 10 2 The Court, held 5-4, with Justice Kennedy,
joining the four liberals and writing the majority opinion, that Congress'
barring non-citizens held as unlawful enemy combatants from access to
the federal courts by means of a writ of habeas corpus was not a proper
exercise of Congressional power under the "suspension" clause. 0 3 The
Court held that there was no "rebellion" or "invasion" within the
meaning of the "suspension" clause, and that the remedy of limited
review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
was not an adequate substitute for the writ of habeas corpus. 104
Professor Chemerinsky discusses these cases at length and points out
that they are cases where Justice Kennedy joined the four liberals to
own war powers, placed on his powers. The Government does not argue otherwise."
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 593 n.23 (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637). In regard to the
assertion of presidential power in the "war on terrorism," the Court has also held that the
Guantanamo detainees were entitled to file a writ of habeas corpus in the federal courts to
challenge the legality of their detention, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 483 (2004), and
that while Congress had authorized the President to detain, as an "enemy combatant," an
American citizen captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan, due process required that he
be given a meaningful opportunity to challenge the legality of that detention before a
neutral decision-maker. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533. In Exparte Milligan, the Court held that
it was unconstitutional to try an American civilian before a military commission for
crimes relating to aiding the Confederacy during the Civil War. 71 U.S. 2, 135-36 (1866).
The Court emphasized that Milligan was a non-belligerent, and that the acts took place in
Indiana, where the civil courts were open and functioning. Id. During the Civil War,
President Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus. In Ex parte Merryman, the
military commander of Fort McHenry arrested an American citizen residing in Maryland
and ordered him confined at Fort McHenry. 17 F. Cas. 144, 147 (C.C.Md. 1861). He
brought an application for a writ of habeas corpus in a federal court in Maryland, where
Roger Taney, the Chief Justice of the United States, was sitting as a Circuit Justice. Id.
President Lincoln had suspended the writ of habeas corpus, and Taney held that only
Congress, and not the President, had the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. Id.
at 152-53. Congress subsequently enacted legislation suspending the writ. See Comment,
Obstructing Justice: The Rise and Fall of the AEDPA, 41 SAN DmO L. REv. 839, 883
n.204 (2004). As Justice Scalia explained in his dissenting opinion in Hamdi, in
Merryman, Taney rejected Lincoln's unauthorized suspension of the writ, and this
decision, along with the English practice, as well as the Suspension's Clause placement
in Article I, supports the general understanding that only Congress can suspend the writ.
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 562-63 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
101. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
102. Id. at 2240.
103. Id. at 2262.
104. Id. at 2269-70.
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provide a majority, over the dissents of the conservative Justices.05 As
the decisions in these cases and the other 5-4 decisions in the high profile
cases demonstrate, Justice Kennedy is indeed, as Professor Chemerinsky
maintains, the "swing" Justice in the ideologically based 5-4 decisions of
the Court. 106 In terms of the development of constitutional doctrine and a
possible departure from what I consider to be the settled nature of
American constitutional law, these cases provided the opportunity for the
conservative Justices to change considerably existing constitutional
doctrine with respect to the existence of presidential power in military
matters. Instead, because of the influence of Justice Kennedy, the Court
adhered to what I consider to be existing constitutional doctrine in this
area, and also rendered an important decision as to the meaning of the
suspension clause. As Professor Chemerinsky points out, these cases
were the "most important disappointments for conservatives,"10 7 and the
Court's decisions in these cases support my contention that the Roberts
Court's move in a conservative direction was "not by very much."10 8 In
these cases, because of the influence of Justice Kennedy, it did not move
in a conservative direction at all.
Similarly, and again I believe because of the influence of Justice
Kennedy, the Court's decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, 109 was a
move in the conservative direction, but "not by very much." In Heller,
the Court considered a Second Amendment challenge to a District of
Columbia law that virtually prohibited any possession of a firearm in the
home and that required that any firearm that could be possessed in the
home had to be locked." 0 The Court held 5-4, in an opinion by Justice
Scalia, that the Second Amendment created a private individual right to
possess a loaded handgun in the home for self-defense."' In his opinion,
Justice Scalia relied on historical interpretation (a method of
constitutional analysis that he strongly favors) to establish the
proposition that the Second Amendment was intended to create a private
individual right to keep and bear arms and was not limited to the
possession of weapons in connection with service in the militia." 2 He
105. Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 953-55. The holding in Hamdan was 5-3, since
Justice Roberts, who participated in the case when it was before the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia and who ruled against Hamdan, recused himself
when the case came before the Supreme Court. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 557.
106. Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 953.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 972-73.
109. 127 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
110. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2787-88.
111. Id. at 2821-22.
112. Id. at 2788-17.
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then went on to say (albeit in a footnote) that since the right to keep and
bear arms was an enumerated right, heightened scrutiny, as opposed to
rational basis, applied to determine the constitutionality of laws
prohibiting or regulating gun ownership. 113 He concluded that, "[u]nder
any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated
constitutional rights, banning from the home 'the most preferred firearm
in the nation' to 'keep and use for protection of one's home and family,'
would fail constitutional muster."'"
14
Since the only issue before the Court in Heller was the
constitutionality of the sweeping District of Columbia ban on the
possession of an unlocked handgun in the home for purposes of self-
defense, 115 the opinion could have stopped there. " 6 The specific holding
of Heller was that a complete ban on the possession of an unlocked
handgun in the home for purposes of self-defense violated the Second
Amendment,117 and the rationale of the Court's opinion in Heller would
be applied by lower courts and ultimately by the Court itself in future
cases to determine the constitutionality of any prohibitions or restrictions
on gun ownership. 118 If this was all that the Heller opinion said, the case
would represent a significant victory for advocates of gun ownership and
would provide a constitutional basis for challenging all federal, state and
local laws that in any way prohibited or restricted gun ownership.
Instead, the Scalia opinion went on to limit significantly the scope of
the enumerated constitutional right that the Court had just recognized. '1 9
The Scalia opinion emphasized that the right to keep and bear arms
applied only to law-abiding citizens and did not apply to "dangerous and
unusual weapons" not "in common use at the time of the adoption of the
Second Amendment.' ' 120 He also indicated that under the historical
analysis he had employed, prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons
would not violate the Second Amendment. '21 He then stated: "[n]othing
in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions
113. Id. at 2817 n.27.
114. Id. at 2817-18 (citations omitted).
115. Id. at 2787-88.
116. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821. Justice Scalia observed that, "since this case represents
the Court's first in-depth examination of the Second Amendment, one should not expect
it to clarify the entire field .... Id.
117. Id. at 2821-22.
118. Id. at 2821-22.
119. Id. at 2816-17.
120. Id. at 2817.
121. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816 ("The majority of the 19th century courts to consider
the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the
Second Amendment or state analogues.").
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on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws
forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places, such as schools
and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms."
1 22
I view the Scalia opinion in Heller as having the effect of upholding
most gun control laws. To be sure, it prevents the government from
absolutely prohibiting the possession of a loaded handgun in the
home. 123 But beyond that it is difficult to see how most gun control
legislation could be successfully challenged as violating the newly
recognized enumerated right to keep and bear arms. Courts faced with
challenges to gun control legislation will look to the Scalia opinion to
determine the scope of permissible regulation, and any regulation
stopping short of an absolute ban on gun ownership of handguns and
rifles by law abiding, mentally competent citizens is likely to be upheld.
So, while the decision is an important legal victory for proponents of gun
ownership, the victory is a limited one, and the decision will provide
guidance to Congress and state and local governments when considering
whether to enact gun control laws. If anything, the decision is a signal
that most gun control legislation is likely to be upheld. 1
24
It may be asked why the Scalia opinion, after engaging in a lengthy
historical analysis to establish that the Second Amendment creates a
private individual right to bear and keep arms, went on to limit
significantly the scope of the newly created right. This may be pure
speculation, but I suspect that Scalia needed to limit the right to keep and
bear arms in order to obtain Justice Kennedy's vote. If Scalia had not so
limited this right, it is possible that Kennedy would not have joined the
Scalia opinion, but would have concurred in a separate opinion
containing these limitations. If he had done so, his opinion would have
set forth the holding of the Court, as constituting the narrowest ground of
agreement among the Justices joining in the majority. 125 This would have
meant that Justice Scalia's historical analysis would have been contained
in a plurality opinion rather than in the opinion of the Court, and so
would not have served as a precedent for historical constitutional
interpretation. In any event, Heller, the most important decision of the
122. Id. at 2816-17.
123. Id. at 2821-22.
124. See Robert A. Sedler, Op-Ed, Ruling Upholds Most Gun Control Laws, DETROIT
NEWS, June 30, 2008, at 9A.
125. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) ("When a fragmented Court
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five
Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those
Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds." ) (quoting Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)).
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Roberts Court in terms of recognizing a new individual right, turns out to
limit significantly the scope of this right and to serve as a precedent for
upholding most gun control legislation.
We turn now to the Roberts Court's decisions on abortion and race.
Here Professor Chemerinsky states as follows:
No issues in contemporary American society more define who is
liberal and who is conservative than abortion and race. The
Roberts Court has decided one major case as to each and in both
the Court decided 5-4 in favor of the conservative position and in
each the Court signaled a major shift in the law that is likely to
have significant long-term consequences. 
126
With all due respect, I must disagree with Professor Chemerinsky's
conclusion as to the effect of these decisions. In my opinion, neither
decision brought about a major shift in the law that is likely to have long
term consequences.
In the area of abortion, the Court decided Gonzales,127 where it
upheld on its face the constitutionality of the federal Partial Abortion
Ban Act of 2003,128 which has no exception for the use of this procedure
when it is necessary for the mother's health, and which, according to
Professor Chemerinsky, is more broadly written than the Court said it
would allow in Stenberg v. Carhart,129 when it struck down Nebraska's
partial abortion ban law.130 Professor Chemerinsky maintains, and I
agree, that the difference in result was not due to the different wording of
the law, but to the fact that Justice Alito had replaced Justice
O'Connor. 131 Professor Chemerinsky says that in Gonzales, the Court
changed the standard for evaluating the constitutionality of laws
regulating abortion from that set forth in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey,132 in that it held that the law was constitutional because it was not
an undue burden for a "large fraction of women," as opposed to finding
an abortion regulation unconstitutional if it was an "undue burden for
some women."' 133 He says that, "many state legislatures will see this
126. Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 956.
127. 127 S. Ct. 1610.
128. 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2000).
129. 550 U.S. at 937.
130. Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 957.
131. Id.
132. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
133. Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 958.
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decision as a signal that they can adopt much greater restrictions of
abortion so long as they do not ban all abortions."'
134
It is my submission that Gonzales does not change in any way the
essential holding of Roe v. Wade, 135 reaffirmed in Casey,136 that the state
cannot prohibit any woman from having an abortion prior to viability,
that after viability the state must allow an abortion where necessary to
protect a woman's life or health, and that while the state may regulate the
abortion procedure (after Casey, even to the extent of trying to
discourage a woman from having an abortion), it may not regulate in
such a way that would impose an undue burden on the ability of some
women to obtain an abortion. 137 Gonzales is a very limited decision in
that it dealt only with a particular procedure used in some late-term
abortions. 138 It did not restrict at all the ability of any woman to have an
abortion. 139 Thus, in terms of doctrine and precedent, it did not affect in
any way the holding in Casey that it was unconstitutional for
Pennsylvania to require a married woman to notify her husband before
obtaining an abortion. 140 The holding was based on the finding that a
requirement for spousal notification would be an undue burden on some
women in abusive relationships, because it would prevent them from
obtaining an abortion due to feat of violence on the part of their
husband. 141 In my view, the Casey standard of undue burden on "some
women" applies to laws that would deter women from having an
abortion as opposed to laws that regulate only the particular way that an
abortion can be performed. And, as Professor Chemerinsky notes, the
Court in Gonzales left open the possibility of an "as applied" challenge
to the law, where a woman and her doctor could argue that in her case
the law was an undue burden on her right to have an abortion by
prohibiting what for her was the safest form of abortion."
42
134. Id. at 959.
135. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
136. 505 U.S. at 857.
137. See id. at 871 (reaffirming the viability principal); id. at 877 (reaffirming the
undue burden limitation on the state's interest).
138. See Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. 1610.
139. Any woman is entitled to the right to have a previability abortion after Gonzales,
which framed the issue as "whether the Act, measured by its text in this facial attack,
imposes a substantial obstacle to the late-term, but previability abortions." Id. at 1632
(emphasis added).
140. Casey, 505 U.S. at 895.
141. Id. at 893-95.
142. Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 959. To the best of my knowledge, no doctor has
been prosecuted for a violation of the federal Partial Birth Abortion Act, and it is difficult
to see a United States Attorney, particularly one appointed by President Obama,
prosecuting a doctor for a violation of the Act where the doctor uses the prohibited
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The significance of Casey was that it reaffirmed the essential holding
of Roe v. Wade, protecting a woman's choice to have an abortion, while
allowing the states greater latitude in regulating the abortion procedure
and in trying to persuade a woman not to have an abortion. 143 It is my
submission that the Court, no matter how constituted, will never overrule
Roe v. Wade, 44 because to do so would have a cataclysmic effect on
American society. In American society today, for large numbers of
American women, abortion has become a fully acceptable way of ending
an unwanted pregnancy. 145 Approximately 1.3 million abortions are
performed in the United States each year. 146 Almost 90% of the abortions
are performed during the first 12 weeks, with most being performed
during the first 9 weeks. 147 Less than 1% of these abortions are
performed after 24 weeks, when the federal partial abortion ban could be
applicable. 148 Despite the seeming controversy over abortion, the reality
is that a woman's right to choose to have an abortion is a part of the
value acceptances of American society today. 149 Since the Supreme
Court will not overrule Roe v. Wade, cases like Gonzales, involving the
constitutionality of abortion regulation, 150 will have no significant impact
on a woman's constitutional right to have a safe and legal abortion.
Moreover, because Gonzales only involved the constitutionality of a ban
on the use of a particular abortion procedure that will be employed in
only a very small number of cases, it will not have significant
precedential effect when relied on to support an abortion regulation, like
the spousal notification rule invalidated in Casey, that could actually
prevent some women from having an abortion. For these reasons, I must
disagree with Professor Chemerinsky's assertion that the decision in
procedure on the ground that the doctor, in his or her best professional judgment, believes
that the procedure is necessary to protect the health of the woman.
143. Casey, 505 U.S. at 857.
144. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See generally Robert A. Sedler, The Supreme Court Will
Not Overrule Roe v. Wade, 34 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1207 (2006).
145. Sedler, Supreme Court, supra note 144, at 1211.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. The latest figures used in the above article were based on 2002 data. Id. at 1211
n.17. The figures also showed that 60% of the women having abortions were already
mothers, which shows that for these women at least, abortion was a "back-up" for
contraception. And, emphasizing the importance of choice, the figures also show that
53% of the women reporting unwanted pregnancies, chose to continue with their
pregnancies rather than have an abortion.
149. Id. at 1212.
150. See Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. 1610.
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Gonzales "signaled a major shift in the law that is likely to have
significant long-term consequences."
' 15
'
In the area of race, the Supreme Court's decisions in the last thirty
years have not been favorable to the efforts of African-Americans and
other racial minorities to implement the constitutional value of racial
equality. The most important of these decisions was Washington v.
Davis, 52 where the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause renders
unconstitutional only express racial discrimination, and that a facially
neutral law is not violative of Equal Protection despite the fact that it
may have a "disproportionate impact" or "discriminatory effect" on
racial minorities. 153 Thus, in order to challenge a facially neutral law or
governmental action because of its racially discriminatory effect, it is
necessary to show that this discriminatory effect was intended by the
governmental body enacting the law or by the government officials
administering it.' 54 Because of the present consequences of a long and
tragic history of racial discrimination in American society, the
application of facially neutral laws or governmental action will often
disadvantage racial minorities in comparison with whites, but this will
not render the law or governmental action subject to constitutional
challenge unless the assailant can surmount the very onerous burden of
showing discriminatory intent. 155 As a result of the intent to discriminate
requirement, the ability of African-Americans and other racial minorities
to challenge a law or governmental action reinforcing the present
consequences of the long and tragic history of racial discrimination in
this nation has been severely impaired.
The intent to discriminate requirement, doctrinally embodied in the
concept of de jure segregation, resulted in the undoing of court-ordered
desegregation plans designed to remedy what had been de jure
segregation on the part of school districts in the south and elsewhere. The
151. Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 956.
152. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
153. Id. at 239.
154. Id. at 242.
155. See e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 470 (1996) (regarding
African-American defendant who showed that all of the defendants in "crack cocaine"
cases defended by the federal Public Defender in the previous year were African-
American, but the Court held that this was insufficient to establish intentional racial
discrimination in "crack cocaine" prosecutions in the absence of a showing that whites
had also been involved in the sale or use of "crack cocaine" and were not prosecuted);
City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Foundation, 538 U.S. 188, 195-96
(2003) (holding that the actions of a city in submitting to the voters a referendum calling
for the repeal of an ordinance authorizing construction of a low-income housing project
was not shown to have been motivated by an intent to discriminate against minority
residents).
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Court held that the courts could not order inter-district desegregation
remedies to include predominantly white suburban school districts that
had not engaged in de jure segregation, even though a decree applicable
only to the urban district that had engaged in de jure segregation would
not be effective to desegregate that district.' 56 It went on to hold that
once court-ordered desegregation plans had been effective to convert a
formerly de jure segregated school district into a unitary one, the school
district could be relieved of compliance with the decree, and could return
to "neighborhood school" assignment, even though this would result in a
large number of racially identifiable schools. 157 And, of course, under the
de jure segregation doctrine, districts that had not engaged in de jure
segregation were free to use "neighborhood school" assignment with the
resultant large number of racially identifiable schools. 58 As a result of
the Court's application of the de jure segregation doctrine and the
unwillingness of most school districts to try to achieve desegregated
schools, a large number of minority students in the nation's schools
today are attending racially identifiable schools.
59
Beginning with its decision in Regents of University of California v.
Bakke, 160 the Court has sharply restricted the ability of governmental
bodies to undertake "affirmative action" programs benefiting racial
minorities and designed to enable them to achieve full and equal
participation in important areas of American life. 16 1 It has done so by
refusing to hold in Bakke and subsequent cases, that overcoming the
present consequences of societal discrimination against African-
Americans and other racial minorities was a compelling governmental
interest, justifying the precisely-tailored use of race-conscious criteria to
achieve this objective.1 62 The only two governmental interests that the
Court has recognized as compelling to justify the affirmative use of race-
conscious criteria benefiting racial minorities are the interest in
remediating the present consequences of identified past discrimination
for which the governmental body is responsible, 163 and achieving a
156. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974).
157. Bd. of Educ. of Oklahoma City Pub. Sch., Indep. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237,
247 (1991); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 99 (1995).
158. See Crawford v. Bd. of Educ. of Los Angeles, 458 U.S. 527, 537-38 (1982).
159. See Gary Orfield and Chungmei Lee, Brown at 50: King's Dream or Plessy's
Nightmare? (Jan. 2004), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/-
reseg04/resegregation04.php (last visited Mar. 7, 2009).
160. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
161. Id. at 307, 319-20.
162. See Richmond v. J.A. Crosson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-98 (1989).
163. Id.; Adarand Constr. Co. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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racially diverse student body in a public university. 164 Even here, the
Court has limited the use of race-conscious criteria. In order to rely on
past governmental discrimination as the basis for a race-based
affirmative action program, there must be a "strong showing in
evidence" that the government had engaged in past discrimination.'
65
And the permissible use of race in student admissions in order to achieve
a racially diverse student body is limited to the situation where the
university takes race into account as only one of the factors in
determining admission.' 66 The Court has held that the use of a racial
quota, even though reasonable in terms of numbers, is not a precisely
tailored means of achieving the diversity objective. 167
My point here is that constitutional doctrine relating to racial
equality is well-settled and the racial cases now coming before the Court
for the most part involve the application of this doctrine to particular uses
of race-conscious criteria by the government. In Grutter v. Bollinger1
68
the Court reconsidered the use of race-conscious admissions programs by
a public university and reaffirmed the holding of Bakke that achieving a
racially diverse student body was a compelling governmental interest and
that taking race into account as one factor in the admissions process was
a precisely tailored means of advancing that interest.1 69 In Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,170 the
Court considered a different issue relating to the use of race by a
governmental body: whether a public school district could use race as a
factor in assigning students to particular high schools within the
district.'7 1 The case was an important one, in that the Court's decision
would determine the constitutional permissibility of efforts by school
164. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 267; Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
165. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986) (plurality opinion);
Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-500; Adarand, 515 U.S. at 221-22.
166. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314.
167. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299. See also Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270-71 (2003)
(invalidating a university's undergraduate race-conscious admissions program that
mechanically assigned a large number of points to an applicant's minority race and that
did not provide for individual consideration of each applicant).
168. 539 U.S. 306.
169. Id. at 343. Despite the widespread public debate in advance of the decision over
its societal impact and despite the media's advance characterization of the case as a
"landmark," the constitutional issue in the case was quite narrow. See Robert A. Sedler,
Op-Ed, U-M Cases Won't Reach Beyond Schools, DETROrr FREE PRESS, June 23, 2003, at
9A; Robert A. Sedler, Commentator in "What Do U-M Court Rulings Mean? Legal
Experts Debate Whether Diversity is Compelling State Interest," DETROIT NEWS, June 24,
2003, at 1 IA.
170. 127 S. Ct. 2738.
171. Id. at 2746.
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districts to achieve school desegregation against the backdrop of
extensive racial residential segregation and concentration. 72 The Seattle
School District had never practiced de jure racial segregation in the
schools, 173 while the Louisville-Jefferson Country School District had
practiced de jure racial segregation, but had long been declared a unitary
district and had been released from judicial supervision. 174 Both districts
had voluntary chosen to try to operate desegregated schools by drawing
attendance zones in such a way as to maximize actual desegregation and
by using a race-conscious transfer program designed to achieve a degree
of racial balance in the different schools. 
175
In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that both desegregation programs
were unconstitutional.1 76 The plurality opinion by Chief Justice Roberts,
joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas and Alito, strongly indicated that
achieving desegregated public schools was not a compelling
governmental interest, so that any effort to use race-conscious criteria in
assigning students was unconstitutional. 177 Here again, Justice Kennedy
supplied the deciding vote, but his opinion diverged sharply from the
plurality opinion of Chief Justice Roberts. 178 Justice Kennedy found that
assigning individual students to particular schools on the basis of race, as
was done for a small number of students under the transfer provisions of
both programs, was unconstitutional, and to this extent, agreed with the
Roberts plurality in striking down this feature of the desegregation
programs. 179 But more importantly, Justice Kennedy disagreed with the
Roberts plurality and agreed with the four liberal Justices in dissent that
achieving desegregated public schools was a compelling governmental
172. Id. at 2755.
173. Id. at 2747.
174. Id. at 2749. The author, while a Professor at the University of Kentucky College
of Law, was the lead counsel in the litigation involving the Louisville and Jefferson
County School Districts. Both districts had practiced de jure segregation, and the Sixth
Circuit held that, in view of the historic interrelationship between the two districts for
segregative and other purposes, the courts could order a desegregation plan that crossed
school district lines and could order the merger of the two districts. The Louisville-
Jefferson County school district litigation is discussed fully, with citations to the court
decisions, in Robert A. Sedler, The Louisville-Jefferson County School Desegregation
Case: A Lawyer's Retrospective, 105 THE REGISTER OF THE KENTUCKY HISTORICAL
SOCIETY 3 (Winter, 2007).
175. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. at 2746.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 2755-59 (plurality opinion).
178. Id. at 2791 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
179. Id.
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interest. 180 Thus, there were five votes and so a holding of the Court on
this issue. 1
8
'
Justice Kennedy went on to discuss the permissible means that
school districts could use to achieve desegregated public schools. Here,
he stated as follows:
School boards may pursue the goal of bringing together students
of diverse backgrounds and races through other means, including
strategic site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones
with general recognition of the demographics neighborhoods;
allocating resources for special programs; recruiting students and
faculty in a targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments,
performance, and other statistics by race. These mechanisms are
race conscious but do not lead to different treatment based on a
classification that tells each student that he or she is to be defined
by race, so it is unlikely any of them would demand strict
scrutiny to be found permissible. 1
8 2
The Kennedy opinion represents the holding of the Court in Seattle
School District No. 1, and will serve as a guide to school districts seeking
to achieve racially desegregated schools.
In my opinion, the holding in Seattle School District No. 1, based on
the Kennedy concurring opinion, is actually a victory, though less than a
complete one, for voluntary school desegregation in the public schools.
The opinion holds that the school district's interest in achieving racially
desegregated public schools is a compelling governmental interest, and
that school districts can use racially conscious assignment methods to
achieve this objective so long as they stop short of assigning individual
students to particular schools on the basis of race.1 83 Thus, it is my
180. Id. at 2789.
181. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. at 2788. Justice Kennedy stated as follows:
The plurality opinion is too dismissive of the legitimate interest government
has in ensuring all people have equal opportunity regardless of their race....
The plurality opinion is at least open to the interpretation that the Constitution
requires school districts to ignore the problem of de facto resegregation in
schooling. I cannot endorse that conclusion. To the extent that the plurality
opinion suggests the Constitution mandates that state and local school
authorities must accept the status quo of racial isolation in schools, it is, in my
view, profoundly mistaken.
Id. at 2791.
182. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. at 2792.
183. Id. at 2753-54. I must disagree with Professor Chemerinsky's assertion that it is
questionable whether these methods will be effective in achieving meaningful
desegregation. Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 959. These were the primary methods used
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submission that insofar as the Court in Seattle School District No. 1
decided a new issue as to the permissible use of race by governmental
bodies, it came down on the side of such use, so that the decision in
Seattle School District No. 1, thanks to Justice Kennedy, is actually a
decision favorable to school desegregation and is more in accord with the
views of the liberal Members of the Court than with the conservative
ones. 184
Turning briefly to the other high-profile decisions of the Roberts
Court identified by Professor Chemerinsky, we see that in Kennedy v.
Louisiana,185 Justice Kennedy joined the four liberals to hold that the
imposition of the death penalty for child rape constituted cruel and
unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.186 This
decision reaffirmed existing death penalty doctrine that the death penalty
can be imposed only for the crime of murder, and in fact continues a
trend of limiting the circumstances in which the death penalty can be
imposed. 
87
Professor Chemerinsky has identified four First Amendment cases,
where he says that the Court divided on liberal-conservative lines and
where Justice Kennedy cast the deciding vote on the conservative side. 1
88
Two of these were cases where the Court upheld First Amendment
challenges to federal campaign finance laws, 189 and in this area, the
conservative Justices are more disposed to find unconstitutional
campaign finance laws, while the liberal justices are more disposed to
uphold them. The development of constitutional doctrine in this area
by both schools districts, and the race-based assignment under the transfer provisions
were only a small part of the overall program, 3% in Louisville. I made a presentation on
the Seattle School District No. 1 decision at the University of Louisville in April, 2008,
and was informed at that time that the Louisville-Jefferson County School Board was
continuing to operate the voluntary school desegregation program, with modifications to
conform to the Supreme Court's decision in Seattle School District No. 1.
184. It will be recalled that the decision in Bakke, while invalidating the particular
quota-type race-conscious admissions program in that case, provided guidelines for the
permissible use of race-conscious admissions programs by public universities. See Robert
A. Sedler, Beyond Bakke: The Constitution and Redressing the Social History of Racism,
14 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 134, 141-45 (1979) (regarding the contemporary discussion
of the Bakke decision).
185. 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008).
186. Id. at 2646.
187. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits imposing the death penalty on a juvenile); See also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304 (2005) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits imposing the death penalty on
a mentally retarded person).
188. See Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 954-55.
189. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. 2652; see also Davis, 128 S. Ct. 2759.
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begins with the Court's landmark decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 190
holding that money is "speech" for purposes of the First Amendment, so
that governmental regulation of campaign financing is subject to First
Amendment limitations. ' 9' Following Buckley, the Court has rendered a
series of fact-specific decisions, sometimes upholding particular
restrictions on campaign finance, 192 and sometimes, as in these two
cases, invalidating them. 193 The results in these two cases do not work
any significant change in First Amendment doctrine relating to the
constitutionality of campaign finance laws.' 94  In a third First
Amendment case, the Court held that the First Amendment did not apply
to public statements made by a government employee in the course of the
employee's official duties. 195 That decision is in accord with other
decisions in this area that limit to some extent the First Amendment
protection afforded to the speech of government employees.' 
96
190. 424 U.S. 1.
191. Id.
192. See e.g., Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (holding that the ban on direct contributions by
corporations can constitutionally be applied to ban such contributions by nonprofit
advocacy corporations); McConnell, 540 U.S. 93 (upholding most of the "soft money"
restrictions contained in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C. § 431 et
seq. (2009)).
193. In Wisconsin Right to Life, the Court held that the prohibition of section 203(a) of
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (2009), prohibiting
the use of corporate or funds to finance "electioneering communications" violated the
First Amendment rights of a not-for-profit corporation when applied to its issue-advocacy
communications, here an ad naming a Senator running for re-election and urging voters
to contact the Senator and urge the Senator to oppose the filibustering of judicial
nominees. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2652. In Davis, the Court held unconstitutional
the "millionaires" amendment to the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Act, 2 U.S.C. § 441a-
1 (2009), relaxing the limits on the ability of an opponent of a self-financed House of
Representatives candidate to raise money from donors and to coordinate campaign
spending with party committees. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2759. The Court found that the
amendment effectively penalized the self-financed candidate's ability to use personal
funds to finance campaign speech, and produced fundmising advantages for the
opponent, without any compelling governmental interest in doing so. Id.
194. Since my own view is that restrictions on campaign finance raise serious First
Amendment questions, a view shared by some civil liberties organizations, such as the
American Civil Liberties Union, I am supportive of these decisions. See Robert A.
Sedler, Op-Ed, McCain Bill Imperils Free Speech, DETROIT NEWS, April 18, 2001.
195. Garcetti, 547 U.S. 410.
196. The most important limitation is that the employee's speech is protected only
when the employee is speaking as a citizen upon matters of public concern, as opposed to
matters of personal interest. See Connick. v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (discussing
questionnaire distributed by assistant district attorney to other assistant district attorneys
concerning office transfer policy and other questions relating to the conduct of the office
by the district attorney was not speech upon a matter of public concern).
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The most interesting First Amendment case identified by Professor
Chemerinsky is Morse v. Frederick,197 where the Court held that the
First Amendment was not violated when a high school student was
disciplined for displaying a banner at a school assembly reading, "Bong
Hits 4 Jesus."' 98 The Opinion of the Court, authored by Chief Justice
Roberts, and joined in by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito,
agreed that the principal could reasonably view the message on the
banner as promoting illegal drug use.' 99 Justice Breyer concurred on the
ground that in this action for damages the principal could properly assert
qualified immunity.2 °° Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter and
Ginsburg dissented, expressing a concern that the opinion could be
interpreted as authorizing school officials to prohibit students from
commenting on "the wisdom of the war on drugs or of legalizing
marijuana for medicinal use.",20 1 This concern should be alleviated by the
concurring opinion of Justices Alito and Kennedy, saying that the
Court's opinion was limited to the advocacy of illegal conduct, and that
the opinion "provides no support for any restriction on speech that
plausibly could be interpreted as commenting on any political or social
issue," and here quoting from the Stevens dissent, speech commenting on
"the wisdom of the war on drugs or of legalizing marijuana for medicinal
use." 20 2 The concurring opinion strongly disagreed with the position
advanced by the school officials, supported by the United States as
amicus curiae, that the First Amendment permits school officials to
center any student speech that interferes with the school's "educational
,,20
mission.03 It turns out then that, based on the Alito and Kennedy
concurrence, the decision is limited to prohibiting the advocacy of illegal
conduct by students, and that the difference between the Alito-Kennedy
concurrence and the Stevens dissent was over whether the principal
could reasonably conclude that the banner advocated illegal drug use.2°4
Thus, the decision is a very limited restriction on the free speech rights of
public school students, and is not inconsistent with other restrictions that
197. 127 S. Ct. 2618.
198. Id. at 2621-22.
199. Id. at 2625.
200. Id. at 2638-42 (Breyer, J., concurring).
201. Id. at 2649 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 2636-38 (Alito, J., concurring).
203. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2636.
204. Kennedy and Alito said that the principal could reasonably conclude that the
banner advocated illegal drug use. Id. at 2636. Justice Stevens, in his dissent, said that
this conclusion "practically refutes itself." Id. at 2649 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the Court has upheld.2 °5 What is most important as regards the free
speech rights of public school students is that, because of the Alito-
Kennedy concurrence,20 6 public school officials cannot prohibit speech
that they deem "politically incorrect," such as a student's expression
opposition to homosexuality, on the ground that such speech is
inconsistent with the school's "educational mission., 20 7
Although, as I maintain, the "law of the Constitution" is relatively
settled at this time in the Nation's history, it is not static. The "law of the
Constitution" can change in significant respects as a result of Supreme
Court decisions applying the "law of the Constitution" in cases
presenting new issues and as a result of the Court's contraction or
expansion of existing precedents. While the Court is reluctant to overrule
particular precedents, it can contract or expand them in such a way as to
significantly undercut their precedential authority. The cases that can
produce significant change in the "law of the Constitution" are those
where the issues in the case are defined by ideology, and where the result
in the case is not clearly determined by the application of settled
doctrine. And there are other cases where the Court's decision, although
not departing in a major way from settled constitutional doctrine, can
have an important impact on public policy. It is in these kinds of cases
where the changed composition of the Court can make a major
difference.
It is my submission that looking to the cases identified by Professor
Chemerinsky as the most important decisions of the Roberts Court, we
do not see, for the most part, any significant change in the "law of the
Constitution," nor do we see any decisions that when viewed carefully in
terms of their specific holding, will have an important public policy
impact. And, as Professor Chemerinsky has demonstrated, and as I have
explained further, this is due to the influence of Justice Kennedy on the
Court.
205. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (holding that school
officials may discipline a student for delivering a speech at a student assembly that
contained a number of sexual innuendos); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S.
260 (1988) (holding that where the publication of a school newspaper is a part of a
regular course for which academic credit is given, the faculty advisor could exercise
editorial control over the content of the student work that would be published in the
newspaper).
206. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2636 (Alito, J., concurring).
207. In this sense, the decision is a reaffirmation of the right to student speech on
political issues that was first recognized in Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969). See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2636-38 (Alito, J. concurring).
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The one decision making a significant change in the "law of the
Constitution" is District of Columbia v. Heller,2 °s since in that case, the
Court for the first time held that the Second Amendment creates an
individual right to keep and bear arms.20 9 However, as I have tried to
demonstrate, the Scalia opinion for the Court in Heller, influenced in my
view by a concern with avoiding a Kennedy concurrence that would limit
significantly the scope of the enumerated constitutional right that the
Court had just recognized, went on itself to limit significantly the scope
of that right.10 So, while the decision does make a significant doctrinal
change in the "law of the Constitution," that change likely will not
invalidate most gun control laws. It thus may be a decision that is
important doctrinally, but that is not likely to have a significant public
policy impact.
The Court did have an opportunity to make an important change in
constitutional doctrine relating to the imposition of the death penalty in
Kennedy v. Louisiana,2 11 where it could have departed from existing
precedent and held that the death penalty could be imposed for crimes
other than murder. 2 It did not do so, because Justice Kennedy joined
the four liberal Justices to hold that the imposition of the death penalty
for child rape constituted cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of
the Eighth Amendment.213
Similarly, because of Justice Kennedy's voting with the four liberals
in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,214 the Court continued to reject the assertion of
Presidential power over Congressional power "in time of war,, 215 and in
Boumediene v. Bush,216 again because of Justice Kennedy's voting with
the four liberals, the Court narrowly interpreted Congress's power to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus. As Professor Chemerinsky notes, "the
most important disappointments for conservatives have been in the two
cases ruling against the Bush Administration with regard to the
Guantanamo detainees, [where] Justice Kennedy joined with Justices
Stevens, Souter, Breyer and Ginsburg to create the majority." 217
Parents Involved is a case where the Court's decision could have had
an important impact on governmental policy in that it dealt with
208. 128 S. Ct. 2783.
209. Id. at 2817-18.
210. Id. at 2816-17.
211. 128 S. Ct. 2641.
212. Id. at 2651-54.
213. Id. at 2646.
214. 548 U.S. at 557.
215. Id. at 611-12.
216. 128 S. Ct. 2229.
217. Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 973.
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constitutional limitations on the power of school districts to achieve
school desegregation against the backdrop of extensive racial residential
segregation and concentration. The plurality opinion of Chief Justice
Roberts strongly indicated that achieving desegregated public schools
was not a compelling govermnental interest, so that any effort to use
race-conscious criteria in assigning students was unconstitutional. I8 But
here again, Justice Kennedy stepped in and prevented the Roberts Court
from rendering such a sweeping holding. Instead, Justice Kennedy
agreed with the four liberal Justices in dissent that achieving
desegregated public schools was a compelling governmental interest,
thus providing a holding of the Court on this important issue.219 His
concurring opinion, representing the holding of the Court on the issue of
permissible means of achieving such desegregation, held that the school
districts could use racially-conscious assignment methods so long as they
stop short of assigning individual students to particular schools on the
basis of race. 220 For these reason, it is my submission that the decision in
Seattle School District No. 1, as per the Justice Kennedy concurrence,
will have the effect of enabling school districts to take a wide range of
actions, short of individual race-based assignment, to achieve
desegregated schools.22'
Finally, the decision in Gonzales v. Carhart,222 is a decision
supporting the conservative position favoring greater regulation of
abortion. However, the law in question only dealt with a ban on the use
of a particular procedure that will be employed in only a very small
number of cases. The decision will not have significant precedential
effect when relied on to support an abortion regulation that could
actually prevent some women from having an abortion. And, of course, it
does nothing to alter the essential holding of Roe v. Wade, protecting a
woman's right to have a safe and legal abortion.223 Thus, the decision has
virtually no effect on constitutional doctrine relating to abortion rights
and will not in any way interfere with the ability of American women to
have a safe and legal abortion.
My review of the "most important and high profile cases during the
Roberts era" thus leads me to the conclusion that, as I believe I have
demonstrated, while the Roberts Court may have moved in a
conservative direction, it has not done so by very much, and that the
218. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. at 2755-59 (plurality opinion).
219. See id. at 2788 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
220. Id. at 2791.
221. See discussion and accompanying text, supra notes 179-183.
222. 550 U.S. at 124.
223. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
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decisions of the Roberts Court may have some impact on American
constitutional law, but not very much.
V. A CONCLUDING NOTE: THE FUTURE OF THE ROBERTS COURT
As Professor Chemerinsky has stated, and as we have seen in our
review of what Professor Chemerinsky has identified as the most
important decisions of the Roberts Court, "The bottom line is that when
the Court is divided 5-4 on issues where there are clear liberal and
,,224
conservative positions, Justice Kennedy is the swing vote. And, as
we have seen, Justice Kennedy's deciding vote has prevented the Roberts
Court from moving very far in a conservative direction and has brought
about the result that the Court's decisions have not had very much impact
on American constitutional law. In the 5-4 decisions where he joined
with the liberal Justices, the Court rejected the assertion of Presidential
power over Congressional power "in time of war," narrowly interpreted
Congress's power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus,225 and refused to
extend the circumstances in which the death penalty can be imposed.226
In Seattle School District No. 1, his concurring opinion set forth the
holding of the Court on the issue of the power of school districts to use
race-conscious admissions criteria in order to achieve desegregated
schools, and he upheld such use so long as it fell short of assigning
individual students to particular schools on the basis of race.227 And I
strongly suspect that the Scalia opinion in Heller was influenced by a
concern with avoiding a Kennedy concurrence that would limit
significantly the scope of the enumerated constitutional right that the
Court had just recognized, so that the opinion went on itself to limit
significantly the scope of that right.
For these reasons, it is indeed proper, as Professor Chemerinsky
maintains, to refer to the Roberts Court as the Anthony Kennedy Court.
Now that we know that for the next four years any vacancies on the
Court will be filled by liberal appointees of President Obama, for the
next four years at least, to quote Professor Chemerinsky, "[t]he Court
will likely stay the same as it is now-a Court where when it matters
most, is the Anthony Kennedy Court. ' 228 And, I would submit, if the
Court does move in a conservative direction, it will not be by very much,
224. Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 953.
225. See discussion and accompanying text, supra notes 98-108.
226. See discussion and accompanying text, supra notes 186-188.
227. See discussion and accompanying text, supra notes 179-185.
228. Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 981.
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and that if these decisions do have some impact on American
constitutional law, it will not be very much.
